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Abstract
This paper considers the problem of pet overpopulation. It develops a tractable dynamic model whose
positive predictions square well with key features of the current U.S. market for pets. The model is used
to understand, from a welfare economic perspective, the sense in which there is \overpopulation" of pets
and the underlying causes of the problem. The paper also employs the model to consider what policies
might be implemented to deal with the problem. A calibrated example is developed to illustrate these
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The market for companion animals in the U.S. is important economically and socially. About
63 percent of households own pets, and they spend substantial amounts feeding and taking care
of them.1 Pets generate signi￿cant psychic bene￿ts for their owners. Indeed, according to a
recent survey, a majority of owners view their pets as members of their families (APPMA, 2005).
However, there are reasons to believe that the market for pets produces less than socially optimal
outcomes. The key problem is that of pet overpopulation. There is little demand for older pets
relinquished by their owners due to changes in personal circumstances, such as job loss, foreclosure,
divorce, or health problems. Even owners with mixed breed puppies or kittens often have trouble
￿nding homes for them. As a consequence, an estimated 11 million dogs and 9 million cats enter
animal shelters annually, and 5 million dogs and 6 million cats end up being euthanized. At the
same time, new owners are buying pure breed puppies and kittens for signi￿cant sums of money.
The problem of pet overpopulation has generated much public interest and discussion about
appropriate policy responses. The most common approach is to work on the supply side of the
market by encouraging, or even requiring, the neutering and spaying of pets. The California
legislature, for example, recently considered a mandatory neutering policy, which would have
represented the ￿rst such state-level policy.2 An alternative, but largely untested, strategy is to
work on the demand side, by, for example, taxing the sale of pure breed puppies or kittens, or
otherwise encouraging citizens to adopt shelter dogs or cats.
The economics literature has been surprisingly silent on the problem of pet overpopulation and,
indeed, on the economics of pets more generally.3 In particular, the literature has not provided
an understanding of the performance of the market for companion animals and the appropriate
role for government intervention. Given their long-lived nature, it is natural to think of pets as
1 According to AVMA (2002), dog owners report spending $261 on average during 2001 on veterinary services
alone, and cat owners reported spending $157. In terms of food, dog owners spent $241 on average during 2004,
and cat owners spent $185 (APPMA, 2005).
2 This proposal was eventually shelved due to opposition from breeders and other constituencies (Associated
Press, July 11, 2007).
3 A few papers have explored the demand for pets using survey data (see, for example, Endenburg, ’t Hart,
and Bouw (1994) and Hirschman (1994)). These papers seek to understand the reasons why consumers do or do
not keep pets. Schwarz, Troyer, and Walker (2007) explore the timing of household spending on pets over the life
cycle and its correlation with the number and age of children. Their theoretical framework is a life cycle model
in which households simultaneously choose children and pets. They show empirically that pets are a substitute
for very young children and a complement with older children. In all phases of the life cycle, a larger number of
children is associated with a lower number of pets.
1durable goods. However, there are important di￿erences between companion animals and other
durable goods. Perhaps the key one is that, due to bonding, consumers care about the pets they
have owned. This has two consequences. First, consumers obtain a higher payo￿ from an older
animal if they owned it when young. Second, owners who have to relinquish their pets su￿er
psychic costs if they do not ￿nd homes and are euthanized. A further distinctive feature is that
the future population of pets is \produced" by the current population. Moreover, the production
costs of mixed breed pets may actually be negative since production can only be prevented by
costly spaying and neutering.
This paper presents a model of the market that captures some of its complexities and uses it to
analyze market performance and the scope for bene￿cial government intervention. The equilibrium
of the model qualitatively matches key features of the markets for dogs and cats in the U.S.. Old
pets relinquished by their owners are euthanized, while pure breed puppies and kittens are sold
for a positive price. Mixed breed puppies and kittens are available for free; some are adopted
and some euthanized. The euthanization of pets makes the equilibrium ine￿cient and it is in this
sense that the market creates pet overpopulation. The ine￿ciency stems from the assumption that
consumers care about the animals they have owned. A common pool externality arises from the
￿xed number of \good homes" to which young or relinquished older pets can be allocated. When
making their breeding or spaying decisions, owners do not take into account that their puppies
or kittens crowd out homes for other needy pets. Restoring e￿ciency requires a combination of
taxes on young pets and subsidies for spaying.
A calibrated example is developed to illustrate the nature of the optimal corrective policies
and to quantify the magnitude of potential welfare gains. The parameters of the model are chosen
so the equilibrium quantitatively matches the market for dogs in the U.S.. The optimal taxes on
young dogs are large, exceeding the prices currently paid for pure breed puppies. The aggregate
welfare gains are also sizable, in the $16 to $21 billion range. These estimates suggest that the
problem of pet overpopulation deserves serious policy consideration.
The paper contributes to an extensive literature on the pet overpopulation problem, mostly
written by veterinarians and psychologists. This literature seeks to understand how many pets are
taken to shelters, why they are taken, and their fate after arrival. It is also interested in the deter-
minants of spaying and neutering decisions, and the dynamics of pet populations more generally.
While this literature provides vital information about the problem, it does not o￿er an analytical
2framework in which to consider optimal policy responses. The one exception is Frank (2004) who
develops and calibrates a mathematical population ￿ow model of the dog population. He then
uses this model to assess the cost e￿ectiveness of di￿erent strategies for reducing euthanization
rates, including spaying subsidies and programs designed to encourage adoption, such as taxes on
non-shelter dogs.4 Viewing these programs as substitutes, he ￿nds that spaying subsidies are
the most cost e￿ective. Allowing for synergies, he concludes that spaying subsidies and programs
designed to encourage adoption work well in tandem. Frank’s work di￿ers from ours in that his
model is ecological rather than economic. Thus, there are no prices, and demand and supply
behavior is not derived from the decisions of optimizing agents.5 In addition, his model does not
distinguish between young and old, or pure and mixed breed dogs. On the other hand, his model
better handles some of the complexities of the market, including the role of pet stores and feral
populations. Given all this, we see our analysis as complementary to Frank’s work.
The paper also contributes to the literature on the economics of animals, particularly that
strand developing dynamic models of animal populations. One branch of this work focuses on wild
animals that are hunted by humans for meat, fur, or other by-products. Examples are beavers
(Carlos and Lewis (1993)), bu￿alo (Taylor (2007)), elephants (Kremer and Morcom (2000)), ￿sh
(Gordon (1954)), and whales (Allen and Keay (2004)). In sharp contrast to pets, the key concern
for these animals is overexploitation and the resulting problems of underpopulation and potential
extinction. A second branch of this literature focuses on farm animal populations (see, for example,
Rosen (1987) and Rosen, Murphy and Scheinkman (1994)). The main interest lies in understanding
the dynamics of stocks of farm animals. Given this research, it seems natural to investigate the
dynamics of companion animal populations and our paper does exactly this.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides background on
the market for pets and Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 characterizes market equilibrium
and Section 5 explores e￿ciency. Section 6 identi￿es policy interventions that can improve welfare
and Section 7 develops a calibrated example to illustrate these policies. Section 8 concludes.
4 In addition to reducing euthanasia rates, Frank (2001) also considers other objectives depending upon animal
welfare. For example, he investigates which programs would minimize animal su￿ering, which, according to his
de￿nition, includes not only the su￿ering for those animals euthanized but also the su￿ering associated with living
in overcrowded shelters or the di￿culties of surving in the wild.
5 The e￿ectiveness of di￿erent strategies is assessed by tracing out the implications of changing certain key
behavioral parameters in the model (for example, the fraction of owners who spay or neuter their dogs, or the
fraction of owners who adopt pets from shelters) and using survey data to speculate on how costly it would be to
generate the behavioral change in question.
32 Background
Dogs and cats are the most popular type of pets in the U.S. with 39 percent of households owning
dogs and 34 percent owning cats (APPMA, 2005). Among dog-owning households, the most
common number is one (60 percent) followed by two (25 percent), with an average of 1.7. Cat-
owning households, by contrast, are more likely to own multiple cats, with about half owning more
than one (AVMA, 2002). A key distinction in the market for pets is pure versus mixed breed, with
about half of dog-owning households in possession of a pure breed (New et. al., 2000). Pure breed
cats, by contrast, are relatively rare, with over 90 percent of cat-owning households in possession
of a mixed breed.
Owners typically acquire their pets as puppies or kittens.6 Common suppliers include breed-
ers, owners who advertise in the classi￿eds, animal shelters, friends and relatives, and pet stores.
In terms of the market for puppies, prices paid by owners vary signi￿cantly by breed (APPMA,
2005). On average, owners spent almost $500 for pure breeds. The market conditions for mixed
breed dogs are less clear. In some regions, there is an excess supply of mixed breed puppies, and
households can adopt them for free from animal shelters. In others, shelters report having very
few puppies, suggesting that mixed breeds are being sold at a positive price (DiGiacomo, Arluke,
and Patronek, 1998). However, even in this case, the prices paid are well below those for pure
breeds. Pure breed kittens can also be expensive, with prices of $300 and up for popular breeds.
Mixed breed kittens, however, are typically available for free adoption at animal shelters.
Pet ownership is regulated at the local level, with considerable variation both across and within
states. Local ordinances limit the number and type of animals that can be owned, and restrict the
way in which households may keep their pets.7 In most communities, dog owners are required to
purchase licenses for their animals. Licenses are typically in the $10-$50 range for an intact dog,
with a 50 percent discount for spaying or neutering, and must be renewed annually.8 In certain
communities, cat licenses are also required. Revenue from licenses is used to ￿nance animal control
6 According to a survey in an Indiana community, 84 percent of dogs and cats were obtained when they were
less than one year old (Patronek, Beck, and Glickman, 1997).
7 For example, some communities limit the number of dogs that can be owned by a household (e.g., less than
four), others ban ownership of certain breeds (e.g., pit bulls), and almost all prohibit the roaming of dogs.
8 There is little information on the fraction of households who actually obtain licenses for their pets. In Frank’s
(2001) survey of a region of upstate New York, 72 percent of dog owners claimed to have obtained a license.
Enforcement is usually done by a public o￿cial who visits homes to check if pets have tags.
4operations and to provide (or subsidize) animal shelters.
Animal shelters, which are typically either local governmental agencies or non-pro￿t orga-
nizations, handle a huge number of unwanted pets. According to the Shelter Statistics Survey,
1994-1997, which surveyed roughly 1000 shelters, over 2.3 million dogs and 1.8 million cats entered
these shelters on an annual basis.9 Assuming that the respondents represent a random sample
of the roughly 5000 national shelters, this implies that over 11 million dogs and around 9 million
cats enter shelters annually. In terms of their sources, puppies and kittens, typically mixed-breed,
are brought in by owners who cannot ￿nd them homes, older pets are brought in by owners who
can no longer take care of them, and strays, which include those dumped by their owners, are
brought in by animal control.10
Pets entering a shelter are eventually either adopted, returned to their owners, or euthanized.
For dogs, the most likely outcome is euthanasia (56 percent) with 25 percent adopted and 16
percent being returned to their owners. Cats are also adopted at a rate of about 25 percent. Very
few cats are returned to their owners, however, and over 70 percent of cats entering shelters are
euthanized. Again, assuming that the survey represents a random sample of shelters, this implies
that over 5 million dogs and 6 million cats are euthanized annually.
While there is no national information on which types of dogs and cats tend to be euthanized
versus adopted in shelters, some anecdotal evidence is available. Using data from a shelter in
Sacremento County, California, Lepper, Kass, and Hart (2002) ￿nd that age is a key determinant
of euthanasia. Puppies, de￿ned as less than 1 year old, were more than two times as likely to be
adopted as dogs 1 to 2 years old and about three times as likely as dogs 3 to 5 years old. Dogs
over 5 years of age were very unlikely to be adopted, with adoption rates just 2 percent of those of
puppies. For cats, kittens were about 20 times more likely to be adopted than older cats, de￿ned
as over 5 years old.
An important issue is why owners relinquish their older pets to shelters. Diacomo, Arluke
and Patronek’s (1998) case study suggests that, for most relinquishing owners, giving up a pet is
9 These data were obtained from the website http://www.petpopulation.org/statsurvey.html (accessed June
2009).
10 According to the Shelter Statistics Survey, 38 percent of pets entering shelters were submitted by animal
control, 30 percent were relinquished by owners, and 32 percent were classi￿ed as either other or unknown sources.
In terms of the types of pets relinquished by owners, data from another survey suggests that pets in shelters,
relative to pets in households, tend to be younger, including a large number of puppies and kitttens, and of mixed
breed status (New et al, 2000).
5very traumatic. Survey data suggest that both unforeseen changes in the owner’s situation and
behavioral issues with the pet are key causes of relinquishment. The two most common reasons
o￿ered for giving up dogs were moving and issues with landlords. Behavioral problems, such as
illness and biting, were also important, but lower on the list of reasons. For cats, allergies and
moving are common reasons for relinquishment.11
In response to the signi￿cant euthanasia of both cats and dogs, several policies have been
proposed and implemented. Pets adopted from shelters, for example, must typically be spayed or
neutered. As noted above, licenses are usually set at lower prices for altered pets. The discount
can be substantial as in Chicago, Illinois, where a license costs $5 for an altered dog versus $50 for
an intact dog. A few cities, such as Santa Cruz, California, have established mandatory neutering
policies. Despite these e￿orts, a large number of pets remain intact. According to a recent survey
of pet-owning households conducted by New et. al. (2000), only 60 percent of dogs and 78 percent
of cats have been neutered or spayed.
In conclusion, we want to highlight four key features of the market for pets that are crucial
for the development of the model. First, there is an important distinction between younger and
older pets, with strong demand for younger pets and much weaker demand for relinquished older
pets. Second, among younger pets, there is strong demand for pure breeds, as evidenced by the
high prices for pure breed puppies and kittens. Third, for young mixed breed pets, excess supply,
zero price, and euthanasia are very common. Finally, changes in personal circumstances beyond
the control of the owner are often key factors in the relinquishment of pets.
3 The model
We develop a dynamic partial equilibrium model of the market for a single species of pet, such as
dogs or cats.
3.1 Pets and owners
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 1;::::;1. There are a continuum of in￿nitely-lived potential
pet owners of size 1=￿ where ￿ 2 (0;1). Each owner can own at most one pet in any period.
Moreover, each owner is able to own a pet in any period with probability ￿, implying that the size
of the population able to own a pet in any period is 1. This uncertainty is designed to capture
11 This information is taken from the website http://www.petpopulation.org/exploring.pdf (accessed June 2009).
6random events (divorce, job loss, health problems, etc) which impact the ability to own a pet. All
owners discount future payo￿s at rate ￿.
Pets come in two varieties, pure and mixed breed, indexed by i 2 fp;mg, and live for at most
two periods. In their ￿rst period of life, pets are young and, in the second, they are old. A pet’s
age is indexed by a 2 fy;og. Young pets can die of natural causes before they get old. The
probability that a young pet reaches old age is ￿ < 1.
Potential pet owners are divided into two groups, low and high types, indexed by K 2 fL;Hg.
The fraction of K types in the population is ￿K. High types have a preference for pure breeds and
low types do not. Speci￿cally, high types enjoy a period bene￿t ￿ from owning a young mixed
breed and ￿ + ￿ from a young pure breed, while low types obtain ￿ from either. The bene￿ts
potential owners get from owning an old pet are the same as those from owning a young pet if
they owned the pet when young. Otherwise, bene￿ts are de￿ated by the parameter ￿ 2 (0;1).
Thus, high types get a bene￿t ￿(￿ +￿) from an old pure breed they did not own when young and
￿￿ from an old mixed breed, while low types get ￿￿ from either. This de￿ation captures the idea
that owning an old pet is not as much fun as a young one, although a pet owned when young
creates a bond which compensates for this.
When young, pets can have o￿spring. There are x o￿spring in a litter. Young pets can be
spayed at cost cs. A young mixed breed that is not spayed will produce a litter of mixed breed
o￿spring with probability ’. Pure breeds can be bred at cost r to produce a litter of pure breed
o￿spring. However, a young pure breed that is neither spayed nor bred will also produce a litter of
mixed breed o￿spring with probability ’. This captures the idea that, in the real world, accidental
mating is unlikely to be with another pure breed of the exact same type and hence the result will
be mixed breed o￿spring. Any owner whose pet has a litter incurs a cost cl as a result of the
event. This captures the costs of providing care to puppies or kittens and the disruption they
cause (whining, chewing, scratching, accidents, etc).
If the pet population exceeds the number of owners, there will be surplus pets and such pets
must be euthanized. Euthanization entails a resource cost ￿ and a psychic cost bourne by the
individual who previously owned the pet. This psychic cost is ￿y for a young pet and ￿o for an
old pet where ￿o ￿ ￿y. The inequality is motivated by the idea that the owner of an old pet will
have a stronger bond to it.
73.2 Allocation and production plans
The economic problem is to determine the intertemporal allocation and production of pets. In
each period, there will be a population of young pets that need to be allocated among new owners,
de￿ned as those who can own a pet but do not currently own an old one.12 There will also be
a population of old pets whose owners are no longer able to keep them and these relinquished old
pets must also be allocated among new owners.13 If there are more pets than available homes,
the surplus pets will be euthanized. In addition to all this, next period’s population of young pets
must be determined by today’s breeding and spaying decisions.
Exploring this problem formally requires a notation that accounts for the populations of pets
in each period and their allocation across owner types. The population of young pure and mixed
breeds at the beginning of period t will be denoted by yt = (ypt;ymt). This population is deter-
mined by the breeding and spaying decisions in period t ￿ 1. The population of old pets at the
beginning of period t can be described by the characteristics of their owners. To understand this,
recall that young pets without owners in period t ￿ 1 are euthanized and hence all old pets at
the beginning of period t will be owned by the owners who owned them when young. Let Ko
it








mt). The population of old pets at the beginning of period t can then be described
by the vector (Ho
t;Lo
t). In particular, the population of old pets of breed i is Ho
it + Lo
it.
In any period, a fraction 1￿￿ of old pet owners will be unable to keep them. Thus, in period
t, old owners will relinquish (1￿￿)(Ho
pt+Lo
pt) pure breeds and (1￿￿)(Ho
mt+Lo
mt) mixed breeds.
The young and relinquished old pets must be allocated among the new owners. The number of
K type new owners in period t will be ￿K ￿ ￿Ko
t . This re￿ects the fact that the total number of
K types who can own pets in each period is ￿K, and the number who will end up being able to
keep their old pets is ￿Ko
t . Let Kn
ait denote the number of K type new owners who are allocated
a pet of age a and breed i in period t. In addition, let Kn







t the composite vector (Kn
yt;Kn
ot).
12 A new owner can own puppies or kittens if he owned a young pet in the previous period which died after
producing a litter.
13 We ignore the possibility of reallocating old pets whose owners can keep them since this will neither be socially
optimal nor part of an equilibrium.
8In each period t, given the population of old pets as summarized by (Ho
t;Lo
t) and the population
of young pets yt, the economic problem is to allocate the young and relinquished old pets among
the new owners by choosing Hn
t and Ln
t , and to determine the population of young pets for the next
period by choosing yt+1. The allocation decisions made in period t will determine next period’s





re￿ects the assumptions that young pets reach old age with probability ￿ and that all young pets
not owned in period t are euthanized. The transition equation creates an intertemporal linkage
between today’s allocation decisions and tomorrow’s allocation problem.
The choice of Hn
t and Ln
t must respect certain feasibility constraints.14 The ￿rst is that the





omt ￿ ￿K ￿ ￿Ko
t K 2 fL;Hg: (1)
The second class of constraints says that the number of new owners allocated each type of pet
cannot exceed the total numbers available. Thus, for the young pets,
Ln
yit + Hn
yit ￿ yit i 2 fp;mg; (2)
and, for the relinquished old pets,
Ln
oit + Hn
oit ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(Lo
it + Ho
it) i 2 fp;mg: (3)
Subtracting the left from the right hand side of these equations, gives the number of pets of each
type that will be without homes and must therefore be euthanized.
An allocation and production plan (Hn
t ;Ln
t ;yt+1)1
t=1 is a description of the allocation and
production decisions in each period. A plan (Hn
t ;Ln
t ;yt+1)1
t=1 is feasible if, given the populations
of old and young pets the community begins with in period 1 (i.e., (Ho
1;Lo





yt), the period t choice (Hn
t ;Ln
t ;yt+1) satis￿es the
feasibility constraints (1), (2), and (3) for all t.
3.3 Welfare
The particular allocation and production plan chosen will determine the (pet-related) surplus




t ;yt+1) denote the surplus accruing in period
14 The choice of yt+1 must also respect the feasibility constraints that there be su￿cient young pets in period
t to generate the period t + 1 populations yt+1. Since the focus of our analysis is on problems of overpopulation,
we avoid the notational burden of explicitly introducing these constraints. We will also not be explicit that all
variables must be non-negative, although the analysis will respect these constraints.
9t given the initial old and young pet populations (Ho
t;Lo
t) and yt, and the period t choices (Hn
t ;Ln
t )
and yt+1. This surplus comes from four di￿erent sources which we now describe.
The ￿rst source is the bene￿t enjoyed by owners of old pets who are able to keep them in
period t. This is given by
Bo





The ￿rst term is the bene￿t obtained by high types who own pure breeds and the second is the
bene￿t obtained by mixed breed owners and low types who own pure breeds. The formula re￿ects
the assumptions that old owners are able to keep their pets with probability ￿ and that low types
are indi￿erent between pure and mixed breeds.
The second source of surplus is the bene￿t experienced by new owners in period t. This is
given by
Bn










The ￿rst term is the bene￿t enjoyed by high types owning young pure breeds and the second
the bene￿t from high types owning young mixed breeds and low types owning young pets. The
￿nal two terms are the bene￿ts of new owners owning old relinquished pets. They re￿ect the
assumption that owning an old pet generates less surplus for a new owner than a young pet.
The third component of surplus is the cost of euthanizing pets. As noted earlier, the number
of pets of each type that will need to be euthanized, is obtained by di￿erencing the right and left
hand sides of equations (2) and (3). Thus, total euthanizing costs are

































The ￿rst and second terms re￿ect the direct costs of producing the young pure and mixed breeds.
The third term re￿ects the costs of spaying the pets that are not used for breeding or for generating
mixed breeds.




t ;yt+1) is obtained by adding the new and old owners’
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t ￿ Et ￿ Zt: (8)
Lifetime surplus in the community will be determined by the entire plan. Speci￿cally, given
the ￿rst period populations of old and young pets ((Ho
1;Lo

















3.4 Remarks about the model
The model incorporates many simplifying assumptions designed to keep it tractable and focused on
the most salient considerations. Here we brie￿y identify and discuss some of the most important.
First, by assuming that all pets can have o￿spring, the model ignores issues of gender. This
precludes, among other things, endogenizing the probability that an unspayed pet has o￿spring
and considering the relative e￿ectiveness of spaying versus neutering as population management
strategies. The justi￿cation for this assumption is purely one of tractability: allowing for male and
female pets would double the number of pet types to keep track of and also necessitate introducing
owner preferences for gender. While this might be feasible, the extension would be su￿ciently
involved that it is best left for another paper.
Second, the model assumes that owners can own at most one pet and, moreover, that there is
limited heterogeneity across potential owners in the bene￿ts of pet ownership. These assumptions
e￿ectively make the total demand for pets perfectly inelastic. This permits a clean focus on
consumer decisions of the type of pet to own (i.e., young pure breed, young mixed breed, etc) but
rules out policy e￿ects on the total number of pets owned. The assumption of at most one pet
also rules out the possibility of commercial breeders who own a large number of pets and produce
multiple litters of puppies or kittens which they then sell to pet stores. We do this for tractability
but also because most owners purchase their dogs and cats from local small-scale breeders rather
than through pet stores.15
15 For example, Patronek, Beck and Glickman’s (1997) survey of pet owners in St Joseph County, Indiana revealed
that only 9% of dog owning households and 5% of cat owning households obtained their pets from pet stores.
11Third, the model assumes that the only reason an owner relinquishes an old pet is because
he becomes unable to care for it. In reality, dogs and cats develop behavioral problems, such as
aggression or soiling, which make them unsuitable as pets. Indeed, as discussed in Section 2, this
is a major reason for owner relinquishment. Such problems can, in fact, be incorporated into the
model by letting ￿ denote the probability that a pet reaches old age without developing behavioral
problems and assuming that pets that develop such problems are euthanized with no psychic cost
on the part of owners.
Fourth, by assuming all pets without owners are euthanized, we rule out the possibility of
a feral population. This assumption is reasonable for dogs since feral dogs are dangerous and
therefore typically eliminated by animal control.16 However, in many communities, there appear
to be a signi￿cant population of feral cats.17 Recognizing the existence of a feral population would
lead to an additional source of pet supply that could not be controlled via ￿nancial instruments
such as taxes and subsidies.
Finally, in our modelling of the costs of euthanization, we ignore psychic costs bourne by non-
owners who are nonetheless sympathetic to the plight of pets. Such costs are undoubtedly real
because many citizens donate money and time to animal welfare organizations.18 However, the
extent of the pet overpopulation problem suggests that such citizens form a small minority of the
population. Relatedly, our measure of welfare ignores the costs of premature death to the animals
themselves. This is because of di￿culties in knowing how to think about these costs. Given the
￿xed number of potential owners, the premature death of one pet creates a home for another and
it is not clear how to evaluate this trade o￿. Stated simply, would pets behind the veil of ignorance
prefer a world in which they had a lower probability of being born and a longer life if born?
4 Market equilibrium
In a market equilibrium, pet allocation and production decisions are guided by the price mechanism
and individual optimization. There are, in principle, markets for each of the four types of pets
16 Dangers to the community include the transmission of rabies, dog bites, damage to livestock, and car accidents.
17 For example, Patronek, Beck and Glickman’s (1997) survey of pet owners in St Joseph County, Indiana revealed
that 24% reported feeding free-roaming cats that they did not own.
18 According to survey evidence, 17 percent of households, including both owners and non-owners, reported
monetary donations to animal causes, with an average donation among donors of $76 per year (Frank, 2001). In
addition, 10 percent reported volunteering their time, with an average of 54 hours per year among volunteers.
12(young pure breeds, young mixed breeds, old pure breeds, and old mixed breeds) and prices are
determined by the usual requirement that demand equal supply. However, given the limited
number of owners, there may be excess supply for some pet types even at a zero price. In this
case, owners relinquish such pets to a state-run shelter and owners looking for pets of this type
go to the shelter where they can obtain them free of charge. Surplus pets are euthanized by the
shelter, which is ￿nanced by a head tax. Let qait denote the price of a pet of age a and breed
i in period t and let qt denote the vector of period t prices (qypt;qymt;qopt;qomt). Similarly, let
￿ait denote the probability that a pet of age a and breed i taken to the shelter in period t will be
destroyed and let ￿t denote the vector of period t euthanizing probabilities. Obviously, if qait > 0,
then ￿ait = 0.
Given the ￿rst period populations of old and young pets ((Ho
1;Lo









is a market equilibrium if there exist prices (qt)1
t=1 and euthanization probabilities (￿t)1
t=1 such
that in each period t four conditions are satis￿ed. First, owners choose to breed and spay their
animals so as to generate the population of young pets in period t+1, yt+1. Second, new owners
choose pets in a way consistent with (Hn
t ;Ln
t ). Third, for any pet type whose price is positive,
demand equals supply. Fourth, for any pet type with a zero price, supply exceeds demand and
the actual euthanization probabilities are equal to ￿t.
We maintain four assumptions in our analysis of market equilibrium. The ￿rst is that the
expected cost associated with a litter is less than the cost of spaying.
Assumption 1
’cl ￿ cs:
This assumption implies that if owners could ￿nd homes for their pets’ mixed breed o￿spring, they
would choose not to spay them. It therefore implies that young mixed breeds will be in excess
supply. Easily relaxed, the assumption focuses the analysis on the main case of interest.
The second assumption is that the bene￿t of owning a young mixed breed is positive.
Assumption 2
￿ ￿ cs + ￿￿[￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿o] > 0:
The left hand side represents the discounted expected bene￿t from owning a young mixed breed,
assuming that it is spayed and euthanized if the owner has to give it up. In the ￿rst period of the
13pet’s life, the owner gets a payo￿ ￿￿cs. If the pet survives until the second period, an event with
probability ￿, the owner can keep the pet with probability ￿ and obtain a bene￿t ￿. If he has to
give the pet up, he su￿ers a loss ￿o.
The third assumption is that, for a high type, the additional bene￿t of owning a pure rather
than mixed breed exceeds the associated production cost.
Assumption 3
￿(1 + ￿￿￿) >
cl + r ￿ cs
￿x
:
The left hand side represents the additional discounted expected bene￿t of owning a pure breed
for a high type. In the ￿rst period of the pet’s life, the owner gets an additional payo￿ ￿. If the
pet survives until the second period, an event with probability ￿, the owner can keep the pet with
probability ￿ and obtain an additional payo￿ ￿. The right hand side represents the production
costs of a pure breed. A litter of pure breeds creates a cost of cl +r. On the other hand, it will be
necessary to spay one less pure breed, saving spaying costs of cs. The cost of an additional litter
is therefore cl + r ￿ cs and dividing through by x yields the per-pet cost.
The fourth assumption is that for both types of owners, the bene￿t from a young pet exceeds
that from a pair of old shelter pets.
Assumption 4(i)
￿ ￿ cs + ￿￿[￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿o] > ￿￿(1 + ￿￿￿)
4(ii)
￿ + ￿ ￿ cs + ￿￿[￿(￿ + ￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿o] ￿
cl + r ￿ cs
￿x
> ￿(￿ + ￿)(1 + ￿￿￿):
Inequality 4(i) is for low types. The left hand side represents the bene￿t of owning a young
mixed breed and the right hand side the bene￿t of instead owning a pair of old mixed breeds.19
Inequality 4(ii) is for high types. The left hand side represents the bene￿t of a young pure breed
(net of production cost) and the right hand side the bene￿t of a pair of old pure breeds.
Under these assumptions, there exists a market equilibrium in which in periods t ￿ 2, high
type new owners are allocated young pure breeds and low types young mixed breeds, so that
Hn
t = (￿H ￿ ￿Ho
t ;0;0;0) and Ln
t = (0;￿L ￿ ￿Lo
t;0;0). The production of young pure breeds is
su￿cient to meet demand in the next period so that ypt = ￿H ￿ ￿Ho
t . The production of young
19 Obviously, Assumption 4(i) implies Assumption 2. Nonetheless, it is worth distinguishing them as they play
di￿erent roles in the analysis.
14mixed breeds exceeds demand and is given by ymt = (￿L ￿ ￿Lo
t)=[1 ￿ (cs ￿ ’cl)=’x￿￿y]. The
equilibrium price of young pure breeds in periods t ￿ 2 is given by
qypt = qp ￿
cl + r ￿ cs
￿x
; (10)
and the prices of young mixed breeds and old pets are zero, so that qt = (qp;0;0;0). Relinquished
old pets are euthanized with probability 1 and young mixed breeds taken to the shelter are
euthanized with probability
￿ymt = ￿m ￿
cs ￿ ’cl
’(￿x + (1 ￿ ￿)(x ￿ ￿))￿￿y
; (11)
so that ￿t = (0;￿m;1;1).
There are four conditions to check to verify that the allocation and production plan we have
described is a market equilibrium.20 The ￿rst is that owners would choose to breed and spay
their young pets so as to generate the speci￿ed supply. We show in the Appendix that given the
price of young mixed breeds is zero and the euthanization probability is (11), mixed breed owners
will be indi￿erent between spaying or not. Similarly, given the price (10), pure breed owners will
be indi￿erent between breeding or spaying. This indi￿erence means that the supply of young pets
is perfectly elastic at the equilibrium prices and euthanization probabilities. The second condition
is that new owners will choose pets in a way consistent with (Hn
t ;Ln
t ). This requires that high
types purchase young pure breeds and low types obtain young mixed breeds. The other options
for high types are not to acquire a pet or to get a young mixed breed or an old pure breed from
the shelter. For low types, the relevant alternatives are not to acquire a pet, to purchase a young
pure breed, or to get an old shelter pet. The Appendix provides a detailed demonstration that
the postulated equilibrium behavior is optimal, but it follows fairly directly from Assumptions
2-4. The third condition, that supply equals demand for any pet type whose price is positive,
is satis￿ed by construction. The fourth condition, that supply exceeds demand for any pet type
with a zero price and the actual euthanization probabilities are equal to ￿t, can also shown to be
satis￿ed.
20 Notice that our description of the allocation and production plan is incomplete because we have not described
the allocation of young and relinquished old pets among new owners in period 1. However, this only determines
the number of old owners at the beginning of period 2 and our description of the allocation and production plan
from this point on is conditional on this in that period 2 production is given by y2 = (￿H ￿ ￿Ho
2;(￿L ￿ ￿Lo
2)=[1 ￿
(cs ￿ ’cl)=’x￿￿y]). Thus, from the viewpoint of the description of the equilibrium, it does not really matter how
young and relinquished old pets are allocated in period 1.
15The equilibrium implies a dynamic evolution of the population of pets. In period t ￿ 2, the
population of young pets is given by (ypt;ymt) = (￿H ￿￿Ho
t ;(￿L￿￿Lo
t)=(1 ￿ (cs ￿ ’cl)=￿’x￿y)).
Since young pure breeds are owned by high types and uneuthanized young mixed breeds by low
types, it must be the case that if t ￿ 3, (Ho
t ;Lo
t) = (￿ypt￿1;￿ymt￿1(1 ￿ (cs ￿ ’cl)=￿’x￿y)). It
follows that
(ypt;ymt) = (￿H ￿ ￿￿ypt￿1;
￿L
1 ￿ (cs ￿ ’cl)=￿’x￿y
￿ ￿￿ymt￿1): (12)






(1 + ￿￿)(1 ￿ (cs ￿ ’cl)=￿’x￿y)
): (13)
Thus, we have:
Proposition 1 Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4 are satis￿ed. Then, there exists a market
equilibrium in which in period 2 and beyond, high type new owners receive young pure breeds and
low type new owners receive young mixed breeds. All relinquished old pets are euthanized. The
price of young pure breeds is positive, but young mixed breeds are in excess supply and some are
euthanized. The population of young pets converges to the steady state (13).
The equilibrium described in Proposition 1 captures key qualitative features of the markets for
dogs and cats in the U.S.. As noted in Section 2, for both dogs and cats, old pets relinquished by
their owners are unlikely to be adopted at shelters. Pure breed puppies and kittens, on the other
hand, are sold for signi￿cant prices.21 Mixed breed kittens are in excess supply and some are
euthanized. The same is true for mixed breed puppies in many communities.22
5 Pet overpopulation
To provide a benchmark with which to compare the plan generated by the market, we now study
e￿cient plans. A plan is e￿cient if it is feasible and there is no other feasible plan which generates a
higher level of lifetime surplus. The e￿ciency problem is challenging, with many di￿erent decisions
21 As noted in Section 2, the market for pure breed dogs is much larger than that for pure breed cats, suggesting
that the fraction of the population who have a preference for pure breeds (i.e., high types) is much greater for
potential dog owners.
22 If Assumption 1 did not hold so that the expected cost of a litter exceeded the cost of spaying, the price of
young mixed breed pets would have to be positive in equilibrium and none would be euthanized. Thus, the model
suggests that communities in which mixed breed puppies are sold for a positive price will be those in which the
expected costs of a litter are low relative to the cost of spaying.
16to be determined and a complex set of feasibility constraints. However, given that the market
equilibrium converges to a steady state, we can simplify matters by assuming that the e￿cient
plan converges to a steady state. Comparing this with the equilibrium steady state will allow us
to draw conclusions concerning market e￿ciency.
We impose two additional assumptions. The ￿rst is that when all a pet’s o￿spring are eutha-
nized, the expected social cost of it having a litter exceeds the cost of spaying.
Assumption 5
’[￿x(￿y + ￿) + cl] > cs:
The left hand side is the expected social cost of a young pet having a litter under the assumption
that all its o￿spring are euthanized.
The second assumption is that for both types of owners, the social bene￿ts from young pets
are less than those from a pair of old shelter pets.
Assumption 6(i)
￿ ￿ cs + ￿￿[￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿o] +
cs=’ ￿ cl
￿x
< (￿￿ + ￿o + ￿)(1 + ￿￿￿):
6(ii)
￿ + ￿ ￿ cs + ￿￿[￿(￿ + ￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿o] ￿
cl + r ￿ cs
￿x
< [￿(￿ + ￿) + ￿o + ￿](1 + ￿￿￿):
This assumption should be contrasted with Assumption 4, which concerned private bene￿ts. The
key di￿erence is the inclusion of the euthanizing costs ￿o + ￿. Assumption 6 recognizes that if
an owner owns two old pets instead of a young pet, then the old pets are spared from being
euthanized and this saves society ￿o+￿ per pet. Assumption 6(i) also recognizes that it is socially
costly to prevent the production of young mixed breeds since the production cost is negative under
Assumption 1.
With these Assumptions understood, we now present our characterization of the e￿cient steady
state.
Proposition 2 Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 are satis￿ed and that the e￿cient plan
converges to a steady state. Then, in this steady state, no pets are euthanized. If
￿(1 + ￿￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿) >
r + cs(1 ￿ ’)=’
￿x
; (14)
17high type new owners receive young pure breeds and low type new owners receive young mixed





￿L(1 + ￿￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿H
(1 + ￿)(1 + ￿￿)
): (15)
If inequality (14) is not satis￿ed, high type new owners receive young or relinquished old pure









The most notable feature of the e￿cient steady state is that no pets are euthanized. Not only
are no surplus young pets produced, but also all relinquished old pets are allocated to new owners.
This re￿ects Assumptions 5 and 6 which bound below the costs of euthanizing young and old pets.
Together these assumptions imply that a \no kill" policy is optimal in the steady state.23
A further interesting feature is the way relinquished old pets are allocated among new owners.
If high types have a su￿ciently strong preference for pure breeds so that (14) is satis￿ed, all
relinquished old pets are allocated to low types. The additional bene￿t high types receive from
owning young pure breeds is su￿ciently large that it is ine￿cient to deny them ownership. If high
types have only a weak preference, relinquished old pure breeds are allocated to high types and
mixed breeds to low types. In the latter case, the steady state population of young pure breeds is
lower than in the former as can be seen by comparing (15) and (16).
Comparing Proposition 2 with our analysis of the market, we see that when Assumptions
1 through 6 are satis￿ed, the market equilibrium described in Proposition 1 is ine￿cient. The
ine￿ciency arises because pets are euthanized in equilibrium. The result is that the equilibrium
steady state population of pets exceeds the e￿cient steady state level. In this sense, therefore,
the equilibrium exhibits pet overpopulation.
The extent of pet overpopulation can be calculated by subtracting the e￿cient population
of young pets from the equilibrium population. From (15) and (16), the steady state e￿cient
23 As discussed in Section 3.4, the analysis ignores the problem of pets relinquished for behavioral problems. It
is clear that such animals will need to be euthanized and hence a \no-kill" policy can only apply to adoptable pets.












This di￿erence is decreasing in ￿, ’, cl, ￿y, x and ￿, and increasing in ￿, ￿L and cs. Higher spaying
costs, lower litter costs, and lower owner psychic costs will therefore increase overpopulation.
The ine￿ciency of the market equilibrium re￿ects what is essentially a common pool externality
problem. The \common pool" is the limited number of homes available for pets. When owners
of young pets make their breeding or spaying decisions, they do not take into account that their
o￿spring will crowd out homes for other pets. This crowding out is costly because euthanizing
animals is costly. The cost stems from two sources: the direct resource cost and, more importantly,
the fact that owners care about the fate of the animals that they must relinquish.
It is well known that externalities stem from missing markets.24 In our application, the
ine￿ciency would be eliminated: if (i) owners whose pets were euthanized were charged a user fee
by the shelter equal to the resource cost ￿, and, (ii) there were an \adoption market" in which
owners with surplus pets could pay new owners to adopt them. Charging for the resource cost
would ensure that owners fully internalized the cost of euthanizing their pets and would reduce
the relative payo￿ of owning young pets. Opening an adoption market would ensure that e￿cient
trades between new owners and owners with surplus pets were realized. The market would involve
relinquishing old owners paying new owners to adopt their pets rather than obtaining young pets.
In response, the production of young pets would be scaled back and euthanization reduced. The
market would also involve owners of mixed breed puppies and kittens paying new owners to adopt
their pets. These payments would raise the cost of pets having litters and thereby increase spaying.
Both parts of this market ￿x have obvious practical di￿culties. The di￿culty with shelters
charging user fees is that relinquishing owners could avoid them either by dumping their pets in
the wild, or by claiming they were bringing in strays. The di￿culty with the adoption market
is that unscrupulous individuals could claim to adopt a surplus pet, pick up the payment, and
then dump it in the wild. This said, elements of this market solution can be identi￿ed in the real
world. It is commonplace, for example, for owners to persuade friends and relatives to take on
their surplus pets by o￿ering to pay for food and veterinary expenses. In these cases, the personal
connection limits the agency problem. However, the scarcity of personal connections also limits
24 See, for example, Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995).
19the reach of this solution.
6 Combating pet overpopulation
The previous two sections identify assumptions under which the market for pets is ine￿cient. The
ine￿ciency arises because pets are euthanized in equilibrium and this results in the population
of young pets exceeding the e￿cient steady state level. Since the problem stems from a common
pool externality, it is clear that an appropriate set of Pigouvian taxes and subsidies will improve
e￿ciency. But the question is exactly what type of corrective policies will be helpful? This section
addresses this question.
Given the objective of identifying corrective policies that can be imposed on the market, we
assume that pet populations at the time of intervention are consistent with those arising in market




p1 = 0; yp1 = ￿H ￿ ￿Ho
1; and ym1 ￿ ￿L ￿ ￿Lo
1.
Thus, high type old owners own pure breeds and low types mixed breeds. Moreover, the population
of young pure breeds equals the number of high type new owners and the population of young
mixed breeds exceeds the number of low type new owners. Given Proposition 1, this is consistent
with intervention taking place after the market has been guiding allocation and production for
two or more periods.
The optimal corrective policies depend on the strength of high types’ preference for pure breeds.
There are two cases, depending on whether or not (14) holds.
6.1 Strong preferences for pure breeds
If (14) holds, in period 1 and beyond, impose a spaying subsidy equal to
ss = cs ￿ ’cl; (18)
and, in period 2 and beyond, a tax on young pets equal to
Ty = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿￿￿) ￿ ’cl: (19)
20Under these policies, there exists a market equilibrium in which from period 2 onwards, high
type new owners are allocated young pure breeds and low types either young mixed breeds or
relinquished old pets. This means that Hn
t = (￿H ￿ ￿Ho
t ;0;0;0) and Ln
t = (0;￿L ￿ Lo
t ￿ (1 ￿
￿)Ho
t ;(1 ￿ ￿)Ho
t ;(1 ￿ ￿)Lo
t). The production of young pets is su￿cient to meet demand in the
next period so that yt = (￿H ￿ ￿Ho
t ;￿L ￿ Lo
t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Ho
t ). The producer price of young pure
breeds in periods t ￿ 2 supporting this equilibrium is
qypt ￿ qyp =
(1 ￿ ’)cl + r
￿x
: (20)
The prices of young mixed breeds and old pets are zero, as are the probabilities that all pets are
euthanized.
There are three key steps in establishing that this is an equilibrium. First, we must show
that owners will choose to breed and spay their animals so as to generate the speci￿ed supply.
This is established by noting that the subsidy (18) makes mixed breed owners indi￿erent between
spaying or not, and the price (20) makes pure breed owners indi￿erent between breeding or
spaying. Second, we must demonstrate that with the tax (19), low types must be indi￿erent
between obtaining young mixed breeds or relinquished old pets. Third, we must show high types
prefer purchasing young pure breeds to getting old pure breeds from the shelter. This step uses
the fact that (14) is satis￿ed.
Turning to dynamics, in period t ￿ 2, the population of young pets is given by (ypt;ymt) =
(￿H ￿ ￿Ho
t ;￿L ￿ Lo
t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Ho
t ). Since young pure breeds are owned by high types and young
mixed breeds by low types, if t ￿ 3, (Ho
t ;Lo
t) = (￿ypt￿1;￿ymt￿1). It follows that
(ypt;ymt) = (￿H ￿ ￿￿ypt￿1;￿L ￿ ￿ymt￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿ypt￿1): (21)
Given these dynamics, the pet populations converge to the steady state (15).
The fact that the equilibrium converges to the e￿cient steady state does not imply that it
generates higher lifetime surplus than the uncorrected market equilibrium. Short run losses in the
transition could overwhelm long run gains. Fortunately, however, we can prove directly that the
corrected equilibrium generates higher lifetime surplus. Thus, we have:
Proposition 3 Suppose that Assumptions 1-7 are satis￿ed and that (14) holds. Suppose further
that the spaying subsidy (18) is o￿ered in period 1 and beyond, and that the tax (19) is imposed
on owners of young pets in period 2 and beyond. Then, there exists a market equilibrium under
21these policies in which in period 2 and beyond, no pets are euthanized. High type new owners
receive young pure breeds and low type new owners receive young mixed breeds or relinquished old
pets. The population of young pets converges to the e￿cient steady state (15) and the equilibrium
generates higher lifetime surplus than the unregulated equilibrium described in Proposition 1.
6.2 Weak preferences for pure breeds
If (14) does not hold, di￿erential taxes on young pure and mixed breeds are required. Speci￿cally,
in period 1 and beyond, introduce a spaying subsidy equal to (18) as before, and, in period 2 and
beyond, impose a tax on owners of young mixed breeds equal to
Tym = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿￿￿) ￿ ’cl; (22)
and a tax on owners of young pure breeds equal to
Typ = (￿ + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿￿￿) ￿ (
(1 ￿ ’)cl + r
￿x
) ￿ ’cl: (23)
Under these policies, there exists a market equilibrium in which from period 2 onwards, high
type new owners are allocated young or relinquished old pure breeds and low types young or
relinquished old mixed breeds. This means that Hn
t = (￿H ￿ Ho
t ;0;(1 ￿ ￿)Ho




t). The production of young pets is su￿cient to meet demand in the next
period so that yt = (￿H ￿ Ho
t ;￿L ￿ Lo
t). The producer price of young pure breeds in periods
t ￿ 2 remains given by (20). The prices of young mixed breed and old pets are zero, as are the
probabilities that all pets are euthanized.
The only new step in showing this is an equilibrium is demonstrating that, given the tax (23),
high types are indi￿erent between young and relinquished old pure breeds. An interesting fact
about the equilibrium is that the corrective tax on pure breeds may be lower than that on mixed
breeds. From (22) and (23), we see that
Tym ￿ Typ = (
(1 ￿ ’)cl + r
￿x
) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿￿￿): (24)
Since (14) does not hold, the right hand side will be positive for ’cl su￿ciently close to cs. Despite
the higher tax, low types are not tempted to purchase pure breeds because their total purchase
price, qyp + Typ, exceeds that of mixed breeds, Tym.
The dynamic evolution of this equilibrium is such that, in period t ￿ 2, the population of
young pets is given by (ypt;ymt) = (￿H ￿ Ho
t ;￿L ￿ Lo
t). Since young pure breeds are owned by
22high types and young mixed breeds by low types, if t ￿ 3, (Ho
t ;Lo
t) = (￿ypt￿1;￿ymt￿1). It follows
that
(ypt;ymt) = (￿H ￿ ￿ypt￿1;￿L ￿ ￿ymt￿1): (25)
Given these dynamics, the pet populations converge to the steady state (16).
We can again show that lifetime surplus is higher in this equilibrium than in the uncorrected
market equilibrium and thus we have:
Proposition 4 Suppose that Assumptions 1-7 are satis￿ed and that (14) does not hold. Suppose
further that the spaying subsidy (18) is o￿ered in period 1 and beyond, and that the taxes (22) and
(23) are imposed on owners of young pets in period 2 and beyond. Then, there exists a market
equilibrium under these policies in which in period 2 and beyond, no pets are euthanized. High type
new owners receive young or relinquished old pure breeds and low type new owners receive young
or relinquished old mixed breeds. The population of young pets converges to the e￿cient steady
state (16) and the equilibrium generates higher lifetime surplus than the unregulated equilibrium
described in Proposition 1.
6.3 Discussion
Propositions 3 and 4 describe corrective policies that improve welfare and generate e￿cient pet
populations in the long run. There are two key policy tools: taxes on the ownership of young
animals and spaying subsidies. The taxes remedy the ine￿ciency resulting from the euthanization
of relinquished old pets by shifting demand from young to old animals. The spaying subsidy
remedies the ine￿ciency resulting from euthanization of young mixed breeds by choking o￿ their
supply.
When the e￿cient solution involves high type new owners receiving only young pure breeds, a
uniform tax on young pets is all that is necessary. For when this tax is set at the level which makes
low types indi￿erent between young mixed breeds and relinquished old pets, high types strictly
prefer buying young pure breeds. When the optimum involves high types receiving both young
and relinquished old pure breeds, di￿erential taxes are necessary. Pure breeds may be taxed at
a lower rate, which is perhaps counter-intuitive. The result re￿ects the fact that with a uniform
tax su￿cient to make low types indi￿erent, high types will strictly prefer relinquished old pets. A
lower tax, therefore, is necessary to induce them to also purchase young pure breeds.
23How could these policies be implemented? As noted in Section 2, most localities require dog
owners to purchase an annual license. Moreover, in many communities, license fees are already
higher for intact dogs, which acts as a spaying subsidy. The policies could be implemented by
making license fees also vary with a dog’s age. This would only require that localities keep track of
the ages of dogs in their communities. Implementing the policies for cats is more di￿cult because
in most communities they are not licensed. In addition, it would seem harder to monitor both cat
populations and ages.
7 A calibrated example
This section develops a calibrated example of the model. We choose parameters so that the
properties of the equilibrium match the corresponding properties of the market for dogs in the U.S..
Using these parameters, we calculate the combination of taxes and subsidies required to implement
the e￿cient steady state. We also quantify the welfare gains associated with a movement from
the unregulated market equilibrium to the equilibrium under these optimal policies. Finally, we
discuss results using alternative parameter values.
Before discussing the details, we ￿rst address a key simpli￿cation of the model. In particular,
the model assumes a two-period lifetime for pets whereas dogs have a typical lifespan of around
10 years. Given this discrepancy, we interpret a period of the model as 5 years of elapsed time.
We thus consider dogs between 0 and 5 as young and those between 6 and 10 as old.
The ￿rst panel of Table 1 provides a summary of our assumptions. There are three groups of
parameters. The ￿rst, which consists of f￿;￿;cs;￿;’;￿g, can be inferred directly from survey data,
scienti￿c studies, and related sources. Given that an estimated 15 percent of dogs are brought
to shelters on an annual basis and that an estimated 25 percent of these relinquishments are due
to changes in owner circumstances, we estimate the probability of future ownership (￿) to be
0.81.25 Based upon mortality data from the Veterinary Medical Data Base, Patronek, Waters,
and Glickman (1997) estimate that around 25 percent of dogs have died by age 5.5, and we thus
25 According to APPMA (2005), there are around 74 million dogs in the U.S., and, according to the National
Shelter Survey, 11 million, or 15 percent, are brought to shelters in any given year. According to Frank (2001),
around 30 percent of these relinquishments are due to behavioral reasons. In addition, according to New et. al.
(2000), around 45 percent of relinquished dogs are puppies, de￿ned as those below age 1. Under the assumption
that no puppies are relinquished for behavioral reasons, this implies that around 25 percent of relinquishments can
be considered as likely due to changes in owner circumstance, and we thus estimate that 3.8 percent of dogs are
brought to shelters on an annual basis for such reasons. This translates into a 19 percent rate over a 5-year period.
24use 75 percent as an estimate of the probability of natural survival to old age. As mentioned
in Section 3.4, however, we interpret the parameter ￿ as also incorporating relinquishment due
to behavioral reasons, which we estimate to be 23 percent.26 Taken together, the 75 percent
natural survival rate and the 77 percent of dogs without behavioral problems suggests a value for
￿ of 0.58: According to Frank (2001), the cost of neutering or spaying a dog at a low cost clinic is
around $100, and we use this as our value for cs.27 Based upon information regarding the costs
of euthanasia procedures and disposal, we set the resource cost of euthanasia (￿) equal to $100.28
Household survey data on unplanned litters suggests that the probability of producing a mixed
breed o￿spring (’) is equal to 21 percent.29 Finally, using the 5 year length of a period and an
assumed interest rate of 3 percent, we set the discount factor (￿) equal to 0.86.
The second group of parameters, which consists of f￿H;￿L;x;cl;rg, are those that can be
inferred by matching key features of the market for dogs to their theoretical counterparts. We can
infer the mix of high and low types directly from the distribution of pure and mixed breeds. This
is because, in equilibrium, high types own pure breeds and low types mixed breeds. According
to APPMA (2005), approximately 58 percent of dogs are pure-breeds, and we thus set ￿H = 0:58
and ￿L = 0:42.
We can calculate the size of a litter (x) by comparing breeding rates to those implied by our
model. Using the fact that breeding rates for young pure breeds in steady state must equal 1=x
and that the fraction of pure breeds that are young in the model is given by 1=(1 + ￿￿), we have
that the equilibrium probability of breeding among all pure breeds is 1=x(1+￿￿). The household
survey conducted by New et. al. (2000 and 2004) suggests that about 12 percent of owners choose
26 Given that 15 percent of dogs are brought to shelters in any given year and that, according to Frank (2001),
around 30 percent of these relinquishments are due to behavioral reasons, we estimate that around 4.5 percent of
dogs are brought to shelters on an annual basis for such reasons. This implies a 23 percent relinquishment rate due
to behavioral reasons over a 5-year period for young dogs.
27 Note that this estimate does not include any psychic costs for owners from the spaying and neutering pro-
cedures. Many owners cite a belief that dogs should not be altered as a reason for leaving their dog intact, and
this belief may increase the cost of spaying and neutering (Patronek, Beck, and Glickman, 1997). On the other
hand, our estimate of $100 may overstate the true cost since, as noted in Section 2, many municipalities have lower
license fees for altered dogs.
28 Prices typically charged by vets for the euthanasia procedure and cremation total $135. Since shel-
ters may be more e￿cient and since some of the price charged by vets may include pro￿ts, we dis-
count these ￿gures somewhat when estimating shelter costs. These data are taken from the website
http://www.dogbreedinfo.com/timetoletgo.htm (accessed June 2009).
29 According to New et. al. (2004), 1.4 percent of households had an unplanned litter in 1996. This translates
into a 7 percent rate over a 5-year period. Given that 60 percent of dogs in the survey are neutered and that 6
percent had planned litters over a 5-year period, 34 percent of dogs in the survey are neither neutered nor bred,
and this suggests that ’ = 0:07=0:34 = 0:21:
25to breed their dogs.30 Using this and our previously assigned values of ￿ and ￿, we thus estimate
x to be 5:67.
Given a value for ￿y, we can infer the cost of a litter (cl) and breeding costs (r) from the
equilibrium euthanasia probability (11) and price of pure breeds (10). Using our estimates of
f￿;￿;cs;’;￿;xg and an estimate of ￿m, the cost of a litter can be obtained by inverting (11) as
follows:
cl =
cs ￿ ￿m’(￿x + (1 ￿ ￿)(x ￿ ￿))￿￿y
’
: (26)
With this value for cl and an estimate of qp, we can then invert the pricing equation (10) to solve
for breeding costs (r = ￿xqp ￿ cl + cs). The estimate we use of the euthanasia rate for young
mixed breeds is 31 percent and that of the price of pure breed puppies is $489.31 We discuss how
we set ￿y below.
The third group of parameters, which consist of f￿;￿;￿;￿y;￿og, are those for which we have
little information other than the constraints imposed by Assumptions 1-6. To address this issue,
we present estimates for a variety of values. For the baseline analysis, we set the bene￿t from
owning a young pet (￿) equal to 2000 and the bene￿t for high types from owning a pure breed (￿)
to 2000 for the strong preference case and 1000 for the weak case. These should be interpreted as
the 5 year ￿ow of ownership bene￿ts net of costs such as food and veterinary care. In addition, we
set the de￿ation parameter (￿) to 0.75. We next set the value of the psychic costs associated with
euthanizing young dogs (￿y) to 100. This implies that an owner delivering a litter of ￿ve puppies
to a shelter incurs a psychic cost of 500 if he knows for certain that they will be euthanized.
With this estimate of psychic costs in hand, we then calculate cl = 334 and r = 2151 using the
procedure in the preceding paragraph. Finally, for the euthanasia cost for old dogs, Assumption 6
provides a lower bound, which is equal to 444, and Assumption 4 provides an upper bound, which
30 In their household survey, 1.2 percent of households report a planned litter in 1996 and about one-half of dogs
in their survey are pure breeds. Assuming that all planned deliveries are by pure breeds, as is suggested by our
model, then 2.4 percent of pure breeds had a planned litter. Over a 5-year period, this suggests a breeding rate of
12 percent.
31 The estimate of the price of pure breed puppies is taken from APPMA (2005). To understand the estimate
of the euthanasia probability, ￿rst note that we can write Pr(euthanasia) = Pr(euthanasiajyoung)Pr(young) +
Pr(euthanasiajold)Pr(old). In our model we have that Pr(euthanasiajold) = 1, so we can write Pr(euthanasiajyoung)
= [Pr(euthanasia) - Pr(old)]/Pr(young). We use estimates of Pr(euthanasia) = 0.69 from the National Shelter
Survey. To calculate the fraction of dogs brought to shelters who are young, we use information from New et. al.
(2000) on the age distribution of dogs. For the purposes of this calculation, we de￿ne a young dog to be less than
one year of age and thus implicitly assume that all dogs between ages 1 and 5 have behavioral problems and are
thus not adoptable. Given that 45 percent of dogs relinquished to shelters are below one year of age, we estimate
Pr(euthanasiajyoung) = 0.31.
26is 4900. As a baseline value, we set ￿o equal to a relatively conservative 800.
Given these assumed parameters, we now use the model to conduct a numerical welfare
analysis.32 Starting with the strong preference case, the optimal tax on young dogs, as shown in
the second panel of Table 1, equals $632. This is substantial, given that it exceeds current prices
of pure breed puppies. Introducing a tax of this magnitude would represent a dramatic change in
policy and would raise signi￿cant revenues. In the weak preference case, the tax on mixed breeds
remains at $632 but the tax on young pure breeds is a substantially lower $488. This illustrates
the point made in the previous section concerning the relative size of taxes on mixed and pure
breeds. In both cases, the required subsidy on spaying equals $30.
We next compute the welfare gains associated with introducing these optimal policies. In
particular, we assume the initial populations of old and young pets are those associated with
the equilibrium steady state (16) and calculate the di￿erence in lifetime surplus between the
corrected and uncorrected equilibrium.33 These surplus di￿erences are denominated in dollars
and, after dividing by the size of the population (1=￿), can be interpreted as the increase in
discounted lifetime surplus for an average potential owner. As shown in the ￿nal panel of Table
1, we calculate average welfare gains of $239 in the ￿rst case and $185 in the second. To obtain
the aggregate welfare gain, we need to multiply these per capita gains by the number of potential
owners. One way to estimate the number of potential owners would be to note that there were
106 million households in the U.S. in 2000 and that dog ownership rates are 39 percent, which
would imply that the number of potential owners is 51 million. However, this neglects the fact
that, in contrast to the model, many households own multiple dogs. Recognizing this, we count a
household owning n dogs as n potential owners. Given that, as noted in Section 2, owners have
1.7 dogs on average, this leads to an estimate of the number of potential owners of 87 million.
The aggregate welfare gain is therefore approximately $21 billion in the ￿rst case and $16 billion
in the second.
Of course, these baseline results are contingent upon our assumed parameter values. To provide
a feel for sensitivity, we next present results for four alternative scenarios. As shown in Table 2,
we ￿rst increase by 25 percent, relative to their baseline values, the bene￿t from owning a young
pet (￿) and the bene￿t for high types from owning a pure breed (￿). As shown, this increases the
32 We have veri￿ed that Assumptions 1-6 are satis￿ed under this set of parameter values.
33 We make use of expressions for the welfare gains that are developed in the proofs of Propositions 3 and 4.
27required taxes since the prices of young pets must be even higher to induce owners to adopt older
pets. The welfare gains are similar in magnitude to their baseline values. We next decrease ￿ and
￿ by 25 percent, relative to their baseline values. As shown, this decreases the required taxes, but,
again, the welfare gains are similar in magnitude to their baseline values. In the third scenario,
we return ￿ and ￿ to their baseline values and instead increase the psychic costs (￿y and ￿o) from
euthanasia by 25 percent, relative to their baseline values. As shown, the required taxes and
subsidies change only slightly in this case. The welfare gains, by contrast, are signi￿cantly higher.
This re￿ects the fact that these higher psychic costs are avoided in the corrected equilibrium.
Finally, we consider a scenario in which pyschic costs are reduced by 25 percent from their baseline
values. As expected, the welfare gains are smaller in this case.
8 Conclusion
Pet overpopulation is a theoretically interesting and practically relevant economic problem which
has not received much attention from economists. The economic model developed in this paper
provides a clean way of thinking about the problem and sheds light on how to correct it. Moreover,
the quantitative analysis based on the model suggests that there may be signi￿cant welfare gains
to such a correction.
While we feel the paper makes signi￿cant progress, there are limitations that could be addressed
in future work. Incorporating gender and considering the relative e￿ectiveness of spaying versus
neutering would be interesting. So too would be moving beyond two-period lived pets and shedding
more light on how taxes should depend on age. Finally, it would be useful to relax the assumption
of a perfectly inelastic demand for pets by introducing more heterogeneity in ownership bene￿ts.
This would permit consideration of aggregate demand responses to corrective policies.
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9.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We begin by verifying that the allocation and production plan described in the text is a market
equilibrium. The ￿rst condition to check is that owners would choose to breed and spay so as to
generate the speci￿ed supply. This requires that in period t ￿ 1, (￿H ￿ ￿Ho
t )=x owners of young
pure breeds will breed their pets and (￿L ￿ ￿Lo
t)=[’x ￿ (cs ￿ ’cl)=￿￿y] owners of young pets will
neither spay nor breed. We claim that given the price of young mixed breeds is zero and that
the euthanization probability is (11), owners of young mixed breeds will be indi￿erent between
spaying or not. Consider the cost to such an owner of having a litter. In period t ￿ 1 he incurs
a cost cl. In period t, he incurs a further psychic cost of x￿m￿y if the parent pet survives. For
in this case, he will give up all the o￿spring. If the parent dies, the owner again loses x￿m￿y if
he cannot own a pet but only (x ￿ 1)￿m￿y if he can because he can keep one of the litter. The
probability ￿m is such that cs equals ’[cl + ￿(￿x + (1 ￿ ￿)(x ￿ ￿))￿m￿y]; which makes owners
indi￿erent between spaying or not. Similarly, we claim that given the price (10), owners of young
pure breeds will be indi￿erent between breeding or spaying. The cost of breeding (as opposed to
spaying) in period t ￿ 1 is r + cl ￿ cs, while the bene￿t in period t is xqp. The price qp is such
that r + cl ￿ cs = ￿xqp, which makes owners indi￿erent. Note that a high type has strictly less
incentive to have a mixed breed litter, for, in the event that the parent pet dies, a high type owner
that keeps his mixed breed puppy or kitten will forego the ownership of a young pure breed, which
will create a loss of surplus. The postulated breeding and spaying behavior is therefore consistent
with optimization, with the caveat that it is mixed breed owners who are generating the supply
of young mixed breeds.
The second condition is that new owners will choose pets in a way consistent with (Hn
t ;Ln
t ).
Thus, we must show that high type new owners purchase young pure breeds and low types acquire
young mixed breeds. We begin with high type new owners. Consider such an owner at the
beginning of some period t ￿ 2 and assume ￿rst that he does not own any young pets. Let VH(1)
denote his expected equilibrium payo￿. In addition, let VH(0) denote the equilibrium payo￿ of a
high type owner at the beginning of some period t ￿ 2 who does not and cannot own a pet that
34 To preserve space, many details are omitted from these \proofs". Full length proofs are available from the
authors on request.
31period. Under the proposed equilibrium behavior, our owner purchases a young pure breed and
thus
VH(1) = ￿ + ￿ ￿ qp ￿ cs + ￿[￿f￿(￿ + ￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿o + ￿(￿VH(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)VH(0))g
+(1 ￿ ￿)(￿VH(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)VH(0))]:
(27)
This expression re￿ects the facts that: i) a young pure breed costs qp, ii) the owner is indi￿erent
between spaying and breeding and thus can be assumed to spay, iii) a young pet survives to be
old with probability ￿, iv) the owner will keep his old pet with probability ￿, and, v) if the owner
is unable to keep his pet it will be euthanized. Since a potential owner who does not and cannot




1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
)VH(1): (28)
Substituting (28) in to (27), the equilibrium payo￿ of our owner is
VH(1) = [￿ + ￿ ￿ qp ￿ cs + ￿￿f￿(￿ + ￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿og]
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿￿￿)
: (29)
We must show that the owner cannot achieve a higher payo￿ by deviating from his proposed
equilibrium behaviour. It su￿ces to consider one shot deviations and there are three such devi-
ations to study. Suppose ￿rst that he decides not to own any pet. Then his payo￿ under the
deviation is ￿(￿VH(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)VH(0)): Using (28), we have that
VH(1) ￿ ￿(￿VH(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)VH(0)) = VH(1)(
1 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
);
which is positive as long as VH(1) > 0. From (10) and (29), this is the case under Assumptions
2 and 3. Next suppose that our owner decides to obtain a young mixed breed from the shelter.
This yields a payo￿ of
￿ ￿ cs + ￿[￿f￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿o + ￿(￿VH(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)VH(0))g + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿VH(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)VH(0))]:
Using (27), for the deviation to be unpro￿table, we need that ￿(1 + ￿￿￿) ￿ qp. This follows from
(10) and Assumption 3. Finally, suppose that he decides to pick up an old pure breed from the
shelter. The payo￿ from this is ￿(￿ + ￿) + ￿(￿VH(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)VH(0)): Using (28), we have that
VH(1) ￿ [￿(￿ + ￿) + ￿(￿VH(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)VH(0))] = VH(1)(
1 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
) ￿ ￿(￿ + ￿):
32From (29), this di￿erence is non-negative if




Using (10), this is true under Assumption 4(ii).
If the owner owns young pets they will be pure breeds. His expected equilibrium payo￿ will
be VH(1)+xqp. Since the payo￿s from deviating from his proposed equilibrium behavior are also
altered by simply adding xqp, the earlier arguments apply unchanged.
Now consider low type new owners. Consider such an owner at the beginning of some period
t ￿ 2 and assume ￿rst that he does not own any young pets. Let VL(1) denote his expected
equilibrium payo￿. Similarly, let VL(0) denote the equilibrium payo￿ of a low type owner at the
beginning of some period t ￿ 2 who does not and cannot own a pet that period. Under the
proposed equilibrium behavior, our owner obtains a young mixed breed from the shelter and thus
VL(1) = ￿ ￿ cs + ￿[￿f￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿o + ￿(￿VL(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)VL(0))g
+(1 ￿ ￿)(￿VL(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)VL(0))]:
(30)
Again, this assumes that the owner spays his pet which is justi￿ed by the indi￿erence between
spaying and not. As shown for high types
VL(0) = (
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
)VL(1); (31)
and therefore the equilibrium payo￿ of the owner is
VL(1) = [￿ ￿ cs + ￿￿f￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿og]
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿￿￿)
: (32)
Again, we must show that the owner cannot achieve a higher payo￿ by deviating from his
proposed equilibrium behaviour. Suppose ￿rst that he decides not to own any pet. Then his
payo￿ under the deviation is ￿(￿VL(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)VL(0)). Using (31), we have that
VL(1) ￿ ￿(￿VL(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)VL(0)) = VL(1)(
1 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
);
which is positive as long as VL(1) > 0. From (32), this is the case under Assumption 2. Next
suppose that our owner decides to purchase a young pure breed. This yields a payo￿ of
￿ ￿ qp ￿ cs + ￿[￿f￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿o + ￿(￿VL(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)VL(0))g + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿VL(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)VL(0))]:
33Using (30), for this deviation to be unpro￿table, we need only that qp > 0. Finally, suppose that
he decides to pick up an old pet from the shelter. The payo￿ from deviating is ￿￿ + ￿(￿VL(1) +
(1 ￿ ￿)VL(0)): Using (31)
VL(1) ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿(￿VL(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)VL(0)) = VL(1)(
1 ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
) ￿ ￿￿:
From (32), this is non-negative if




This is true under Assumption 4(i).
If the owner owns young pets then they must be mixed breeds. His expected equilibrium
payo￿ will be VL(1)￿(x￿1)￿m￿y. Since the payo￿s from deviating from his proposed equilibrium
behavior are altered by subtracting x￿m￿y, the earlier arguments remain valid.
The third condition is that supply equals demand for any pet type whose price is positive.
The only pet type with a positive price is young pure breed. All new owners who are high types
demand young pure breeds and hence demand in period t ￿ 2 is ￿H ￿ ￿Ho
t : By construction, the
supply is ypt = ￿H ￿ ￿Ho
t and so the condition is satis￿ed.
The fourth condition is that supply exceeds demand for any pet type with a zero price and the
actual euthanization probabilites are equal to ￿t. The only thing to show is that the probability
that a young mixed breed taken to the shelter is euthanized is given by (11). Let t ￿ 2 be given.
The number of low type owners of young pets in period t￿1 is Lo
t=￿. Let ￿t￿1 denote the fraction
of these owners who do not spay their pets in period t ￿ 1. Since all high type owners will either
spay or breed their pets, the number of young mixed breeds in period t is ’x￿t￿1Lo
t=￿: Since it
must be the case that ymt = ’x￿t￿1Lo
t=￿, it follows that ￿t￿1 = ymt=(’xLo
t=￿). The number of
young mixed breeds taken to the shelter in period t is
’fx ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿g￿t￿1Lo




The demand for shelter pets in period t is
￿L ￿ ￿f￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿t￿1’gLo






Thus, the probability that a pet taken to the shelter is euthanized is
fx ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿g
ymt









ymt ￿ [￿L ￿ ￿Lo
t]




34Recalling that ymt = ’x(￿L ￿ ￿Lo
t)=[’x ￿ (cs ￿ ’cl)=￿￿y] yields the result.
It remains to show that given the dynamics of the equilibrium, the pet populations converge
to the steady state (13). From (12), for all t ￿ 2, (ypt+1;ymt+1) = (￿H ￿￿￿ypt;
￿L
1￿(cs￿’cl)=￿’x￿y ￿


































A su￿cient condition for stability is that all the characteristic roots of the matrix have moduli
strictly less than 1 (Sydsaeter (1981), Theorem 7.7). A su￿cient condition for this is that the
sum of the absolute value of the rows of the matrix be less than 1 (Sydsaeter (1981), Theorem
7.8). Since this is satis￿ed, we conclude that the system converges to its steady state, which is
(13). ￿
9.2 Proof of Proposition 2














o2 to maximize the objective function
S(￿Hn￿
y ;￿Ln￿









































































and the constraint that all choice variables must be non-negative.
To interpret this problem, think of y as the number of young pets in some period t; Hn
y and
Ln
y the numbers of young pets allocated to new owners in period t; Hn
o1 and Ln
o1 the numbers of
old relinquished pets allocated to new owners in period t; and Hn
o2 and Ln
o2 the numbers of old
relinquished pets allocated to new owners in period t + 1. The ￿rst set of feasibility constraints
(34) re￿ect those arising in period t and the second set (35) re￿ect those arising in period t + 1.







o as the proposed solution.
Lemma 1 Suppose that Assumption 5 is satis￿ed and that the e￿cient plan converges to a steady
state. Then, in this steady state, no young pets are euthanized.
Proof: We need to show that Hn￿
yi +Ln￿
yi = y￿
i for i 2 fp;mg. We only prove the result for mixed




perturbing the proposed solution by decreasing ym to y￿
m￿￿ where ￿ is small and positive. This
change clearly satis￿es the feasibility constraints (34) and (35) for ￿ su￿ciently small. Denote









) + ￿(￿y + ￿):
This change is positive under Assumption 5 - which contradicts the fact that the proposed solution
must solve the e￿ciency problem. ￿
Lemma 2 Suppose that Assumption 2 is satis￿ed and that the e￿cient plan converges to a steady
state. Then, in this steady state, all new owners have pets.




om = ￿L ￿ ￿￿(Ln￿
yp + Ln￿





om = ￿H ￿￿￿(Hn￿
yp +Hn￿
ym): We show only the ￿rst equality, the argument for the




om < ￿L ￿￿￿(Ln￿
yp +Ln￿
ym): Consider the
36following perturbation of the proposed solution: increase ym to y￿
m + ￿, Ln
ym to Ln￿
ym + ￿; and
Ln
om to Ln￿
om +(1￿￿)￿￿ where ￿ is small and positive. This perturbation satis￿es the feasibility
constraints (34) and (35) for ￿ su￿ciently small. Denote the value of the objective function (33)









) + ￿￿ + ￿2￿(￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿):
This is positive under Assumption 2, which contradicts the fact that the proposed solution solves
the e￿ciency problem. ￿
Lemma 3 Suppose that Assumptions 2 and 3 are satis￿ed and that the e￿cient plan converges
to a steady state. Then, in this steady state, any new owner who receives a young pet has a pure
breed if he is a high type and a mixed breed if he is a low type.
Proof: By Lemma 1, we know that Hn￿
yp +Ln￿
yp = y￿
p and that Hn￿
ym+Ln￿
ym = y￿
m: We need to show
that Ln￿
yp = 0 and Hn￿







show only the ￿rst equality, the argument for the second being similar. Suppose that Ln￿
yp > 0.
Consider the following perturbation of the proposed solution: reduce yp to y￿
p ￿￿, increase ym to
y￿
m + ￿, decrease Ln
yp to Ln￿
yp ￿ ￿, increase Ln
ym to Ln￿
ym + ￿, decrease Ln
op to Ln￿
op ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿,
and increase Ln
om to Ln￿
om + (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿ where ￿ is small and positive. This change is feasible for
su￿ciently small ￿ provided that Ln￿
op > 0, which we assume for now. Denote the value of the










This is positive, which contradicts the fact that the proposed solution solves the e￿ciency problem.
The above analysis assumes that Ln￿
op > 0. If Ln￿




yp), so that some old relinquished pure breeds are euthanized. In this




om. This change is feasible, since
all that happens is that old relinquished mixed breeds are euthanized instead of pure breeds, and
this has no implications for payo￿s. The second possibility is that Hn￿
op = (1 ￿ ￿)￿(Hn￿
yp + Ln￿
yp).
However, with a little work, this can be shown to be impossible. ￿
Lemma 4 Suppose that Assumptions 2, 3, 5, and 6 are satis￿ed and that the e￿cient plan
converges to a steady state. Then, in this steady state, relinquished old pets are not euthanized.














ym). Consider the following perturbation of the proposed solution:





om+￿, and increase Ln
om2 to
Ln￿
om + ￿￿￿ where ￿ is small and positive. This perturbation satis￿es the feasibility constraints
(34) and (35) for ￿ su￿ciently small. Denote the value of the objective function (33) as a function









) + ￿ [cs + ￿o + ￿ ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)] + ￿￿2 [￿o + ￿ ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)]:
This is positive under Assumption 6(i) - which contradicts the fact that the proposed solution
solves the e￿ciency problem. ￿
Lemma 5 Suppose that Assumptions 2, 3, 5, and 6 are satis￿ed and that the e￿cient plan
converges to a steady state. Then, in the e￿cient steady state, any new owner who receives a
relinquished old pet has a pure breed if he is a high type.
Proof: We need to show that Hn￿
om = 0. Suppose that Hn￿
om > 0. Consider the following
perturbation of the proposed solution: increase yp to y￿
p + ￿; reduce ym to y￿
m ￿ ￿, increase
Hn
yp to Hn￿
yp + ￿, reduce Ln
ym to Ln￿
ym ￿ ￿, reduce Hn
om1 to Hn￿







om2￿￿￿, and increase Ln
om2 to Ln￿
om2+￿￿￿
where ￿ is small and positive. This perturbation satis￿es the feasibility constraints (34) and (35)
for ￿ su￿ciently small. Denote the value of the objective function (33) as a function of ￿ as












)] + ￿￿ + ￿2 [￿￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿￿]:
This is positive by Assumption 3 - which contradicts the fact that the proposed solution solves
the e￿ciency problem. ￿













m: Moreover, we know
that (1+￿￿)y￿
p +Hn￿
op = ￿H and (1+￿￿)y￿
m +Ln￿
op +Ln￿
om = ￿L: The only remaining issue is what
is Hn￿
op ? All we know is that Hn￿
op 2 [0;(1￿￿)￿y￿
p]. Once we have pinned down Hn￿
op more precisely
we will have a complete picture of the steady state values of all the endogenous variables.
38To determine the value of Hn￿
op we follow the usual procedure. Suppose that Hn￿
op > 0. Consider
the following perturbation of the proposed solution: increase yp to y￿




yp + ￿, decrease Ln
ym to Ln￿
ym ￿ ￿, decrease Hn
op1 to Hn￿
op ￿ ￿; increase Ln
op1 to
Ln￿
op +￿, decrease Hn
op2 to Hn￿
op2 ￿￿￿￿, increase Ln
op2 to Ln￿
op2 +￿￿, and decrease Ln
om2 to Ln￿
om2 ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿ where ￿ is small and positive. This perturbation satis￿es the feasibility constraints
(34) and (35) for ￿ su￿ciently small. Denote the value of the objective function (33) as a function












)] + ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿2￿￿￿(1 ￿ ￿):
The sign of this derivative is negative if (14) is satis￿ed and positive if it is not. The proposed
perturbation involves a reduction in Hn￿
op . If this derivative is negative, then it must be the
case that increasing Hn￿
op by reversing this perturbation raises surplus. In that case, therefore,
Hn￿
op = (1 ￿ ￿)￿y￿
p. On the other hand, if the derivative is positive, then Hn￿
op = 0.
Suppose therefore that (14) is satis￿ed so that Hn￿
op = (1 ￿ ￿)￿y￿
p. Then given our previous






1+￿), which is the ￿rst part of Proposition 2. On
the other hand, if (14) is not satis￿ed, so that Hn￿







which is the second part of Proposition 2. ￿
9.3 Proof of Proposition 3
There are three things to establish. First, that the allocation and production plan described in
the text is a market equilibrium under the subsidy (18) and the tax (19). Second, that given
the dynamics of the equilibrium, the pet populations converge to the steady state (15). Third,
that lifetime surplus in this equilibrium exceeds that generated by the unregulated equilibrium
described in Proposition 1.
9.3.1 The plan is an equilibrium
Proving this follows the same basic steps as the proof of Proposition 1 and thus we will be brief. To
see that the proposed allocation and production plan satis￿es the ￿rst condition for equilibrium,
note that the price qyp is such that r +cl ￿(cs ￿ss) = ￿xqyp, which makes owners of pure breeds
indi￿erent between breeding or spaying. In addition, given that the price of young mixed breeds is
0 and the post-subsidy price of spaying is cs￿ss = ’cl, owners of all young pets will be indi￿erent
between spaying or not. The third and fourth conditions are also easily veri￿ed.
39It remains to verify the second condition that new owners will choose pets in a way consistent
with the proposed equilibrium. We begin with high type new owners. Consider such an owner at
the beginning of some period t ￿ 2 and assume ￿rst that he does not own any young pets. Let
VH(1) denote his expected equilibrium payo￿. Similarly, let VH(0) denote the equilibrium payo￿
of a high type owner at the beginning of some period t ￿ 2 who does not and cannot own a pet
that period. Under the proposed equilibrium behavior, the owner acquires a young pure breed
and thus
VH(1) = ￿ + ￿ ￿ qyp ￿ (cs ￿ ss) ￿ Ty + ￿[￿f￿(￿ + ￿) + ￿(￿VH(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)VH(0))g





1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
)VH(1); (37)
the equilibrium payo￿ of the owner is
VH(1) = [￿ + ￿ ￿ qyp ￿ (cs ￿ ss) ￿ Ty + ￿￿￿(￿ + ￿)]
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿￿￿)
: (38)
Using this expression, (18), (19), (20) and the fact that (14) is satis￿ed, it is now straightforward
to show that the owner cannot achieve a higher payo￿ by deviating from his proposed equilibrium
behaviour. If he owns young pets, then his equilibrium payo￿ will be unchanged if they are mixed
breeds and increased by xqyp if they are pure breeds. Since the same is true for the payo￿s from
deviating, the arguments remain valid in this case.
Now consider low type new owners. Consider such an owner at the beginning of some period
t ￿ 2 and assume ￿rst that he does not own any young pets. Let VL(1) denote his expected
equilibrium payo￿. Similarly, let VL(0) denote the equilibrium payo￿ of a low type owner at the
beginning of some period t ￿ 2 who does not and cannot own a pet that period. Under the
prescribed equilibrium behavior, the owner either obtains a young mixed breeds or an old pet
from the shelter. In particular, then
VL(1) = ￿ ￿ (cs ￿ ss) ￿ Ty + ￿[￿f￿￿ + ￿(￿VL(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)VL(0))g





1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
)VL(1); (40)
the equilibrium payo￿ of a low type new owner is
VL(1) = [￿ ￿ (cs ￿ ss) ￿ Ty + ￿￿￿￿]
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿￿￿)
: (41)
Using this expression, (18), (19), and (20), it is now straightforward to show that the owner is
indi￿erent between obtaining a young mixed breed or an old pet from the shelter, and that he
cannot achieve a higher payo￿ by deviating from his proposed equilibrium behaviour. If he owns
young pets, then they must be mixed breeds and his equilibrium payo￿s will be unchanged. Since
the same is true for the payo￿s from deviating, the arguments remain valid in this case.
9.3.2 Dynamics
We know from (21) that for all t ￿ 2, (ypt+1;ymt+1) = (￿H ￿￿￿ypt;￿L￿￿ymt￿(1￿￿)￿ypt): This









































A su￿cient condition for stability is that all the characteristic roots of the matrix have moduli
strictly less than 1. The characteristic roots of the matrix are the same as those of its transpose
(Sydsaeter (1981)). The characteristic roots of the transposed matrix have moduli strictly less
than 1 because the sum of the absolute value of its rows are less than 1. Thus, the system converges






t=1 denote the equilibrium allocation and production plan described in Propo-




t=1 denote the equilibrium allocation and production plan under
the subsidy (18) and tax (19). To compute lifetime surplus under these plans, we need to spec-
ify what happens in the ￿rst period; that is, (Hn￿
1 ;Ln￿
1 ) and (Hne
1 ;Lne
1 ). By Assumption 7, the
period 1 populations of young and old pets are such that Ho
m1 = Lo
p1 = 0, yp1 = ￿H ￿ ￿Ho
1, and
ym1 ￿ ￿L ￿￿Lo
1. In this case, in either equilibrium, in period 1 the market will allocate all young
pure breeds to high type new owners and low type new owners will get young mixed breeds. Thus,
Hn￿
1 = Hne
1 = (￿H ￿ ￿Ho
1;0;0;0) and Ln￿
1 = Lne
1 = (0;￿L ￿ ￿Lo
1;0;0):
41Surplus in the market equilibrium Consider the lifetime payo￿s of the di￿erent types of
owners in the market equilibrium. There are ￿H ￿ ￿Ho
1 high type new owners in period 1.
Assuming that they do not own any young pets at the beginning of period 1, these owners obtain








H(1) and V ￿
H(0) are the equilibrium values de￿ned in (28) and (29), and q￿
yp1 is the
equilibrium price of young pure breeds in period 1. This assumes the owner spays his pet in
period 1, but, since the expected net bene￿ts of either breeding or not spaying exactly equal cs,
the payo￿s of new owners who either breed or do not spay their pets will be the same. There are
also ￿L ￿￿Lo
1 low type new owners in period 1. Again, assuming they do not own any young pets








L(1) and V ￿
L(0) are the equilibrium values de￿ned in (31) and (32), and q￿
ym1 is the
equilibrium price of young mixed breeds in period 1 (which may be zero). Turning to old owners,
there are Ho
1 high type old owners in period 1 who, assuming they do not own young pets, obtain
a lifetime surplus of ￿(￿ + ￿) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿o + ￿[￿V ￿
H(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)V ￿
H(0)] and also Lo
1 low type old
owners who obtain ￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿o + ￿[￿V ￿
L(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)V ￿
L(0)]: Finally, there are owners who




types in this group who, assuming that they do not own young pets at the beginning of period 1,
obtain a lifetime surplus of ￿[￿V ￿
H(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)V ￿
H(0)] and (1 ￿ ￿)[
￿L
￿ ￿ Lo
1] low types who obtain
￿[￿V ￿
L(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)V ￿
L(0)].
All the above expressions assume that owners do not own young pets at the beginning of period
1. If an owner does own young pets, we need to add on payments received for these pets and
deduct psychic costs stemming from their euthanization. Notice that any payments are transfers
and will o￿set the costs of purchasing young pets bourne by new owners. Thus, in an aggregate
surplus calculation, all we need do is remove the period 1 prices from the above expressions for
the new owners’ surplus. The aggregate psychic costs from euthanizing young mixed breeds in
period 1, must equal [ym1 ￿ (￿L ￿ ￿Lo
1)]￿y and so to account for these, we deduct this amount
from the sum of new owners’ payo￿s. It is also necessary to account for the taxes necessary to















Aggregate lifetime surplus in the market equilibrium, denoted S￿, is now obtained by adding
the lifetime payo￿s of all the di￿erent types of owners described above (ignoring the ￿rst period
prices) and subtracting the psychic costs of euthanizing surplus young mixed breeds in period 1
and the taxes necessary to ￿nance the shelter.
Surplus in the corrected equilibrium Consider the payo￿s of the di￿erent types of owners
in the corrected equilibrium. There are ￿H ￿ ￿Ho
1 high type new owners in period 1. Assuming
that they do not own any young pets at the beginning of period 1, these owners obtain a lifetime
surplus of
￿ +￿￿qe






H(1) and V e
H(0) are de￿ned in (37) and (38), and qe
yp1 is the equilibrium price of young
pure breeds in period 1. There are also ￿L ￿ ￿Lo
1 low type new owners in period 1 who obtain
￿ ￿ qe
ym1 ￿ ’cl + ￿(￿f￿￿ + ￿[￿V e
L(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)V e
L(0))g + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿V e
L(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)V e
L(0))];
where V e
L(1) and V e
L(0) are de￿ned in (40) and (41), and qe
ym1 is the equilibrium price of young
mixed breeds in period 1. Turning to old owners, there are Ho
1 high type old owners in period
1 who, assuming that they do not own young pets, will obtain a lifetime surplus of ￿(￿ + ￿) ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)￿o + ￿[￿V e
H(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)V e
H(0)] and Lo
1 low type old owners who obtain ￿￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿o +
￿[￿V e
L(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)V e
L(0)]: Finally, there are potential owners who do not and cannot own a pet
in period 1. There are (1￿￿)[
￿H
￿ ￿Ho
1] high types in this group who, assuming that they do not
own young pets, obtain a lifetime surplus of ￿[￿V e
H(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)V e




types who obtain ￿[￿V e
L(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)V e
L(0)]:
To obtain aggregate surplus, denoted Se, we add up the lifetime payo￿s of the di￿erent types
of owners. Again, we deduct period 1 prices from the new owners’ surplus since these are just
transfers. We also subtract the psychic costs of euthanizing surplus young mixed breeds in period
1 (given by [ym1 ￿ (￿L ￿ ￿Lo
1)]￿y) and the taxes necessary to ￿nance the shelter. Since pets are
euthanized only in period 1, the latter are given by ￿[ym1 ￿ (￿L ￿ ￿Lo
1) + (1 ￿ ￿)(Lo
1 + Ho
1)]: We

































Comparing surplus The di￿erence in surplus in the two equilibria may be written as







T is the di￿erence in surplus resulting from the tax on young pets and S￿
s ￿ Se
s is





[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿]￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)




￿ (￿o + ￿)
￿
;
where ￿ = 1￿￿(Ho
1+Lo
1). Using (18), (19) and Assumption 6(i), we have that Ty=(1+￿￿)￿(￿o+￿)




[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿]￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿￿￿)(1 + ￿￿)
ss: (42)




[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿]￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿￿￿)(1 + ￿￿)
ss: (43)






[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿]￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿￿￿)(1 + ￿￿)
ss ￿
[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿]￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿￿￿)(1 + ￿￿)
ss = 0
as required. ￿
9.4 Proof of Proposition 4
There are three things to establish. First, that the allocation and production plan described in
the text is a market equilibrium under the subsidy (18) and the taxes (22) and (23). Second,
that given the dynamics of the equilibrium, the pet populations converge to the steady state
(16). Third, that lifetime surplus in this equilibrium exceeds that generated by the laissez-faire
equilibrium described in Proposition 1.
449.4.1 The plan is an equilibrium
The argument that the proposed allocation and production plan satis￿es the ￿rst condition for
equilibrium is as in Proposition 3. The third and fourth conditions are also easily veri￿ed. It
remains to show that new owners will choose pets in a way consistent with the proposed equilib-
rium. We begin with high type new owners. Consider such an owner at the beginning of some
period t ￿ 2 and assume ￿rst that he does not own any young pets. Let VH(1) denote his expected
equilibrium payo￿ and let VH(0) denote the equilibrium payo￿ of a high type owner who does
not and cannot own a pet. Under the proposed equilibrium behavior, the owner either acquires a
young pure breed or gets an old pure breed from the shelter. In particular, then
VH(1) = ￿ + ￿ ￿ qyp ￿ (cs ￿ ss) ￿ Typ + ￿[￿f￿(￿ + ￿) + ￿(￿VH(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)VH(0))g





1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
)VH(1); (45)
the equilibrium payo￿ of the owner is
VH(1) = [￿ + ￿ ￿ qyp ￿ (cs ￿ ss) ￿ Typ + ￿￿￿(￿ + ￿)]
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿￿￿)
: (46)
Using this expression, (20), (22), and (23), it is now straightforward to show that the owner is
indi￿erent between purchasing a young pure breed and getting an old pure breed from the shelter,
and cannot achieve a higher payo￿ by deviating from his proposed equilibrium behavior. If he
owns young pets, then his equilibrium payo￿ will be unchanged if they are mixed breeds and
increased by xqyp if they are pure breeds. Since the same is true for the payo￿s from deviating,
the arguments remain valid in this case.
Now consider low type new owners. Consider such an owner at the beginning of some period
t ￿ 2 and assume ￿rst that he does not own any young pets. Let VL(1) denote his expected
equilibrium payo￿ and VL(0) the equilibrium payo￿ of a low type owner who does not and cannot
own a pet. Under the prescribed equilibrium behavior, the owner either obtains a young mixed
breed or an old pet from the shelter. In particular, then
VL(1) = ￿ ￿ (cs ￿ ss) ￿ Tym + ￿[￿f￿￿ + ￿(￿VL(1) + (1 ￿ ￿)VL(0))g





1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
)VL(1); (48)
the equilibrium payo￿ of the owner is
VL(1) = [￿ ￿ (cs ￿ ss) ￿ Tym + ￿￿￿￿]
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿￿￿)
: (49)
Using this expression, (20), (22), and (23), it is now straightforward to show that the owner is
indi￿erent between obtaining a young or old mixed breed and cannot achieve a higher payo￿ by
deviating from his proposed equilibrium behavior. If he owns young pets, then they must be
mixed breeds and his equilibrium payo￿s will be unchanged. Since the same is true for the payo￿s
from deviating, the arguments remain valid in this case.
9.4.2 Dynamics
We know from (25) that for all t ￿ 2, (ypt+1;ymt+1) = (￿H ￿ ￿ypt;￿L ￿ ￿ymt). This is a linear









































By the same argument as in Proposition 1, this is a stable system and thus it converges to its
steady state, which is (16).
9.4.3 Surplus comparison
The procedure for comparison follows the steps in the proof of Proposition 3. Surplus in the market
equilibrium, denoted S￿, is as described in that proof. Surplus in the corrected equilibrium,
denoted Se, is the same except with the equilibrium values (45), (46), (48) and (49), the new
equilibrium production levels ye






We may again write the di￿erence in surplus as







T is the di￿erence in surplus resulting from the taxes on young pets and S￿
s ￿ Se
s is















(1+￿￿) ￿ (￿o + ￿)
o
where (￿p;￿m) = (￿H ￿ ￿Ho
1;￿L ￿ ￿Lo
1): Using (18), (22), (23) and Assumption 6, we can show
that Tym=(1 + ￿￿) ￿ (￿o + ￿) is less than ss=(1 + ￿￿) and that Typ=(1 + ￿￿) ￿ (￿o + ￿) is less than




[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿]￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿￿￿)(1 + ￿￿)
ss ￿
[￿p(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿H]￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)




where ￿ = 1 ￿ ￿(Ho
1 + Lo




[￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿]￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿￿￿)(1 + ￿￿)
ss +
[￿H ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿Ho
1]￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)


























47PARAMETER VALUES high θ low θ
ownership probability α 0.81 0.81
probability reaches old age η 0.58 0.58
cost of spaying cs 100 100
resource cost of euthanasia ρ 100 100
probability of mixed breed offspring ϕ 0.21 0.21
discount factor δ 0.86 0.86
fraction of high types γΗ 0.58 0.58
fraction of low types γL 0.42 0.42
offspring in a litter x 5.67 5.67
cost of litter cl 334 334
cost of breeding r 2151 2151
benefit from owning young mixed breed β 2000 2000
benefit for high types from owning pure breed θ 2000 1000
deflation from owning new old pet λ 0.75 0.75
psychic cost for young pet ξy 100 100
psychic cost for old pet ξo 800 800
OPTIMAL POLICIES
tax on young mixed breeds Tym 632 632
tax on young pure breeds Typ 632 488
spaying subsidy ss 30 30
WELFARE GAINS
239 185
TABLE 1: RESULTS FROM CALIBRATIONhigh θ low θ
benefit from owning young mixed breed β 2500 2500
benefit for high types from owning pure breed θ 2500 1250
tax on young mixed-breeds Tym 807 807
tax on young pure-breeds Typ 807 751
spaying subsidy ss 30 30
welfare gains 195 176
high θ low θ
benefit from owning young mixed breed β 1500 1500
benefit for high types from owning pure breed θ 1500 750
tax on young mixed-breeds Tym 456 456
tax on young pure-breeds Typ 456 224
spaying subsidy ss 30 30
welfare gains 282 194
high θ low θ
psychic cost for young pet ξy 125 125
psychic cost for old pet ξo 1000 1000
tax on young mixed-breeds Tym 639 639
tax on young pure-breeds Typ 639 493
spaying subsidy ss 37 37
welfare gains 318 264
high θ low θ
psychic cost for young pet ξy 75 75
psychic cost for old pet ξo 600 600
tax on young mixed-breeds Tym 624 624
tax on young pure-breeds Typ 624 482
spaying subsidy ss 22 22
welfare gains 159 105
LOW PSYCHIC COSTS
TABLE 2: ALTERNATIVE PARAMETER VALUES
LOW BENEFITS FROM OWNERSHIP
HIGH BENEFITS FROM OWNERSHIP
HIGH PSYCHIC COSTS